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208 abstract
Today’s global economic environment is characterized by the high mobility of 
capital and labour across national borders. Against the backdrop of a legal frame-
work governing taxation of cross-border income, this may lead to double taxation 
on the one hand, as well as provide opportunities for tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance on the other. It is well-established that a prerequisite for effective taxation of 
foreign-sourced income earned by “domestic taxpayers” (i.e. tax residents) is the 
system of administrative co-operation across national boundaries, mainly in the 
form of exchange of tax-relevant information between tax authorities. Since the 
lack of information-exchange mechanisms is linked with tax havens and the pro-
liferation of “harmful tax practices”, the OECD put the issue high on the global 
political agenda as early as 1998. Further developments strengthened the impor-
tance of the exchange of information, leading to the so-called “big bang” of 2009, 
i.e. to a significant increase in the number of concluded tax information exchange 
agreements, caused by the growing concern about international tax evasion and 
avoidance in the post-crisis period.
Nowadays the so-called automatic exchange of information (AEOI) between tax 
authorities has emerged as a new global standard. This is mostly due to the devel-
opment of specific national and international models, aimed at enhancing inter-
governmental cooperation in fighting offshore tax evasion. In this regard special 
attention should be drawn to the 2014 release of the OECD’s Common Reporting 
Standard (CRS), which is based on the idea that banks and other financial institu-
tions should play a crucial role in providing information on taxpayer’s income 
and assets to tax authorities around the globe. 
The aim of this paper is to explore some of the most important implications of the 
adoption of the CRS as a global AEOI model. While there are marked advantages 
of the new standard – mainly related to its potential in curbing large-scale off-
shore tax evasion – some important concerns arise as to its implementation on a 
global level. Particular attention will be paid to the issue of coordination of the 
CRS with the other information exchange models (e.g. FATCA) and to the problem 
of protecting taxpayers’ rights and information. 
Keywords: exchange of information, tax transparency, Common Reporting Stand-
ard, FATCA, international tax law
1 IntRoDUctIon
It is quite commonplace for any new scholarly contribution on the subject of in-
ternational taxation to open by remarking on the way in which the legal frame-
work for taxing cross-border economic activities has evolved in the aftermath of 
the latest global economic crisis (the “Great Recession”). In essence, this ongoing 
evolution is founded on the idea that wealthy individuals and large multinational 
companies (MNCs) were somehow allowed legally to avoid payment of their “fair 
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209judgement – notwithstanding its vague content (Stevens, 2014:702) – a coordi-
nated approach for the reform of a pertinent legal framework has emerged, pri-
marily under the auspices of the G20 and the OECD, the epitome of which is the 
initiative against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) (OECD, 2013). 
The new era of “tax transparency”, characterized by the unprecedented levels of 
taxpayer information shared between governments around the globe (Owens, 
2014; Turina, 2016), cannot be viewed separately from this broad context. How-
ever, one crucial point should be added: while the BEPS project and similar initia-
tives are aimed at curbing tax planning schemes which are by definition legal (i.e. 
tax avoidance), the emergence of new forms of inter-governmental cooperation in 
the area of information exchange is mainly aimed at preventing the phenomenon 
of international tax evasion, i.e. taxpayer behaviour that breaks the law, mainly in 
the form of income underreporting. It is therefore unsurprising that the strengthen-
ing of the framework for information exchange was recognized as a political pri-
ority as early as 1998, within the debate on the negative effects of “harmful tax 
practices” and tax havens (OECD, 1998). The issue gained new prominence in 
2008, when several tax evasion scandals broke out; the largest Swiss banks had 
connived in wealthy clients escaping taxation via offshore accounts. Amid much 
fanfare, G20 leaders jointly declared in 2009 that, with regard to taxation, the era 
of bank secrecy was over (G20, 2009). The panacea was found in the so-called 
automatic exchange of information (AEOI), which essentially entails “systematic 
and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the source country to 
the residence country regarding various categories of income (e.g. dividends, 
interest, royalties, salaries, pensions, etc.)” (OECD, 2012:7). 
The catalyst for worldwide expansion of AEOI was a piece of legislation adopted 
in the United States (US) in 2010, commonly called the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) (Grinberg, 2012:352; Zucman, 2015). The subsequent 
quest for “multilateralization” of the mechanics of FATCA – with the key role 
played by banks and other financial institutions – reached a pinnacle in 2014, 
when the OECD published the so-called Global Standard for AEOI, the key 
component of which is the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) (OECD, 2014b). 
Put simply, the CRS shadows the structure of FATCA, with the aim of giving 
governments a proper instrument for retrieving information on the assets their 
tax residents hold with foreign financial institutions, thus putting an end to 
evasive tax practices. 
The aim of this paper is to explore some of the most important implications of the 
adoption of CRS as a universal model for AEOI. While there are marked advan-
tages of the new standard – mainly related to its potential in curbing large-scale 
offshore tax evasion – some important concerns arise as to its implementation on 
a worldwide level. Accordingly, this paper comprises five main sections. Follow-
ing the introductory part, section two traces the development of a legal framework 
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210 OECD’s adoption of the CRS. Particular attention is drawn to FATCA, since it 
acted as the catalyst for future developments under the auspices of the OECD. 
Section three analyses the most important features of the CRS and puts special 
emphasis on its legal and operational basis. Section four examines some of the 
possible pitfalls of the CRS, which need to be taken into account in the evaluation 
of its appropriateness as a global anti-tax evasion instrument. Concluding remarks 
are provided in section five. 
2  a sHoRt HIstoRY of cRoss-boRDeR eXcHanGe of InfoRMatIon 
In taX MatteRs: tHe RoaD to tHe cRs
The slogan “no taxation without representation” not only played a central role in 
the American Revolution, but is also one of the cornerstones of other modern 
Western democracies, in the light of historical movements against arbitrary taxa-
tion (Vanistendael, 1996:15-19). Similarly, from the viewpoint of tax authorities 
and their objective of efficiently enforcing tax laws and collecting taxes due, 
recent times confirm the validity of the saying “no taxation without information” 
(Pomeranz, 2015). This especially applies to taxation of income, since a self-
assessment system prevails in most jurisdictions (Gordon, 1996:103). In other 
words, tax authorities ordinarily collect income tax on the basis of information 
received from the taxpayers themselves, backed up by the authority to request 
relevant information from third parties (e.g. banks) and conduct more detailed 
inquiries into taxpayers’ activities and assets. 
While this system works reasonably well in relation to taxpayers involved in 
purely “domestic” economic activities, the problem arises with regard to resident 
taxpayers who earn at least one part of their income abroad. Since the state wish-
ing to tax foreign-sourced income of its tax residents lacks, under current norms 
of public international law, the same enforcement powers in relation to foreign 
financial institutions and other foreign persons holding relevant information 
(Picciotto, 1992:257-262), it will most likely need to rely on some form of assis-
tance provided by foreign tax authorities in order to enforce tax collection effec-
tively. Unsurprisingly, the data on the extent of international tax evasion and on 
the ensuing loss of tax revenue is staggering. As per official estimates, every year 
USD 100 billion in tax revenues is lost due to offshore tax abuse (Blank and 
Mason, 2014:2). Tax evasion schemes are quite straightforward and will not be 
examined in detail here. Put simply, financial institutions located in tax havens 
facilitate evasion by assisting clients to open accounts in the name of offshore 
entities, by advising clients on offshore structures to hide ownership or assets and 
covering up asset transfers between accounts. The importance of a formidable 
framework for inter-governmental exchange of tax-relevant information was 
recognized very early, long before the high mobility of capital and labour across 
national borders became a quintessential feature of the global economic environ-
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2112.1 a HIstoRIcal oVeRVIeW of InfoRMatIon eXcHanGeThe present-day network of bilateral tax treaties, which have a key role in allocat-
ing taxing rights over cross-border income, is largely based on the intellectual work 
carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1920s, resulting in the 
creation of the first “model tax treaties”. Even at that time, when the economy was 
largely based on “bricks and mortar” and opportunities for cross-border trade and 
investments were severely limited, governments around the globe paid serious 
attention to the issue of international tax evasion (Picciotto, 1992:250-251). More 
remarkably, the history of the exchange of information for tax purposes goes back 
to the double taxation treaties signed between Belgium and France in 1843 and 
between Belgium and the Netherlands in 1845 (Oberson, 2015:4). 
In 1963, the Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (hereinaf-
ter: the OECD Model Convention) was adopted, containing provisions on the 
exchange of information (Ring, 2016:9). Namely, Art. 26 of the OECD Model 
Convention 1963 provided a legal basis for three forms of information exchange: 
1) exchange upon request; 2) spontaneous information exchange; and 3) automatic 
exchange of information (AEOI). The three forms may be combined and some 
other techniques are also possible, such as simultaneous examinations or tax 
examinations abroad. Tax treaty practice has shown that the most frequently used 
method is information exchange upon request where one state requests informa-
tion foreseeably relevant for a specific case from another state. On the other hand, 
spontaneous exchange of information entails provision of foreseeably relevant 
information from one state to another without prior request, when it is supposed 
that the information provided will be of interest to the other state. Finally, AEOI 
entails routine transmission of information on a regular basis without specific 
request from another state. 
Tax treaty provisions replicating Art. 26 of the OECD Model are essential for cor-
rect allocation of taxing rights between treaty partners, primarily from the per-
spective of the state of taxpayer’s residence (Dourado, 2015:1858-1859). Amend-
ments to Art. 26 in subsequent versions of the OECD Model, most recently in 
2014, contributed to the strengthening of information exchange effectiveness in a 
bilateral context (Ring, 2016:13). Most importantly, in line with the global devel-
opments (see below, section 3), since 2009 the focus has shifted on linking Art. 26 
to AEOI, rather than to the previously-favoured exchange upon request (Dourado, 
2015:1853-1854). 
The first efforts for AEOI outside the framework of double tax treaties can be 
traced to the very beginning of the 20th century. Zucman (2015) discusses the first 
national anti-fraud mechanism of 1901 based on AEOI between banks and the tax 
authorities, intended to fight fraud regarding inheritance. In 1908 the first inter-
national treaty on AEOI was signed between France and the UK. For the purpose 
of this paper special attention needs to be drawn to the 1988 Multilateral Conven-
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212 Convention), drafted jointly by the Council of Europe and the OECD, providing 
the possibility for AEOI on a multilateral basis. As stated by Ring (2016:14), its 
status “(…) has allowed it to serve as a vital platform for important international 
developments in exchange of information, as demonstrated by its role in promot-
ing expansion of automatic exchange of information.” 
One should also take note of the role played by the EU in developing anti-tax eva-
sion instruments. The so-called Savings Directive, adopted by the Council of the 
EU in 2003, set out AEOI provisions in respect of specific items of income (i.e. 
interest on savings accounts). Even more importantly, the scope of AEOI between 
tax authorities of EU member states has been significantly expanded by the 2014 
amendments to the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC), mainly un-
der the influence of OECD’s work on the CRS (Somare and Wöhrer, 2015:814).
2.2  fatca cHanGes tHe GaMe: fRoM UnIlateRal actIon  
to MUltIlateRal solUtIon
The US imposes income tax on the basis of both citizenship and residence. The 
citizenship-based tax regime allows US tax authorities to tax worldwide income 
of every US citizen, irrespective of his residence. Certain concessions embodied 
in the US federal tax law are given to US citizens in order to avoid the negative 
effects of double taxation. One is the foreign tax credit which allows US citizens 
to take a tax credit for tax liabilities paid to foreign tax authorities, and the other 
is the foreign earned income exclusion, granting preferential tax treatment for 
foreign-source income (Holm, 2014:459). While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyse the rationale of such a tax regime, it is important to note the prob-
lems with its enforcement, mainly related to the above mentioned issue of infor-
mation deficit on the side of tax authorities. When it comes to taxation of income 
earned abroad not only by US citizens and corporations, but also by individuals 
who are deemed tax residents in the US, income tax essentially turns into a “tax 
on honesty”, particularly in cases where no foreign withholding tax applies. 
2.2.1 the mechanics of fatca and its criticism
Against this backdrop, US legislators amended the federal tax code in March 2010 
by imposing obligation on foreign banks and other financial institutions (FFIs) to 
directly and periodically report to the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) informa-
tion on the financial accounts of US citizens and corporations. These obligations 
imposed mainly upon FFIs and US paying agents were embodied in Sections 1471 
through 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the new regime became 
widely known as Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). If a FFI does 
not comply with this basic requirement, a 30% withholding tax is imposed on a 
variety of payments it derives from US sources (Gupta, 2013:226). The purpose 
of withholding is twofold, as explained by Dourado (2015:1869): “(…) to induce 
foreign financial institutions that were investing in or through participating finan-
cial institutions but not in the US to participate in FATCA and to make the par-
ticipating foreign financial institutions consider stop doing business with non-
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213The UBS banking scandal of 2008, where a banker employed with the Swiss bank 
helped wealthy US citizens to evade US taxes by covertly keeping the money in 
Swiss bank accounts, accelerated the adoption of FATCA (Oberson, 2015:151) 
and the legislation went into effect in July 2014. From a policy perspective, the 
main aim of FATCA is not to raise additional tax revenues but rather to deter and 
discourage future tax evasion (Dizdarevic, 2011:2984-2985). Put simply, in the 
light of the requirements imposed upon banks and other financial institutions, US 
taxpayers would lose the incentive to engage in offshore activities in attempts to 
hide their wealth out of the IRS’s sight. 
From a public international law perspective, the basic problem of FATCA is that it 
is blatantly extraterritorial in application (Mukadi, 2012:1231; Essers, 2014:59). 
It essentially represents an exertion of US law into the jurisdictional realm of 
foreign countries, without their consent. Accordingly, the US has been criticized 
as taking on a one-sided initiative against tax evasion, instead of opting for the 
co-operative route with the participation of other countries (Holm, 2014:449). In 
addition, important questions have been raised with regard to the conflicts between 
FATCA and domestic laws on data protection (Tello, 2014:92).
Debates have also raged over the ability to enforce FATCA effectively, as well as 
over its potential negative effects on the US economy (Blank and Mason, 2014:4-5). 
Critics have pointed to its high compliance and administrative costs (Blank and 
Mason, 2014:5). On the one hand, the IRS would have to increase human resources, 
improve information technology, infrastructure, analyse new data and link it with 
client profiles in original databases in order to enable complete and reliable data 
(Gupta, 2013:38). On the other hand, particularly high compliance costs, related to 
engagement of additional human resources and the upgrade of due diligence pro-
cesses, would arise for financial institutions operating in multiple jurisdictions. It 
was apparent that FFIs would have to adjust their processes and enhance com-
puter systems, educate potential investors on disclosure requirements, maintain 
centralized customer databases and regularly update relevant information.
Moreover, FATCA has been perceived as discouraging investment in US assets, 
thus impeding the growth of the US economy. With the intention of saving money 
intended for due diligence processes and updating their operating systems in 
accordance with the FATCA provisions, FFIs may avoid investments in US assets 
(stocks, bonds), which may lead to reduction of stock indices in the US and other 
financial markets. Furthermore, investment already made in the US may be liqui-
dated. It should also be noted that the number of US citizens renouncing their US 
citizenship has reached the highest rates ever since the introduction of FATCA1. 
1 Annual number of requests in 2011 was 1,781. Further 2,999 requests were made in 2013, which represents 
a 221% increase in comparison to 2012 (932 requests). The year 2014 brought even higher number of citizen-
ship renouncement (3,415) and in 2015 there were approximately 4,300 expatriations (Forbes, 2016). How-
ever, expatriations may also be attributed to causes other than FATCA, such as specific features of determin-
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214 Finally, some FFIs responded to the commitments imposed by FATCA by refusing 
to serve US account holders in order to avoid problems with the IRS (Holm, 
2014:466).
2.2.2 enhancement of fatca on the inter-governmental level
The above described criticism of FATCA urged stakeholders, particularly multi-
national financial institutions (MFIs) and foreign governments, to embark upon a 
quest to create a system incorporating its basic principles, but leaving out the most 
burdensome rules, such as the withholding regime (Grinberg, 2013:332). This 
process of the “globalization” of a unilateral US instrument can be mostly attrib-
uted to the complementary interest shared by the US and other countries in curb-
ing international tax evasion, confirming the predictions that the adoption of FATCA 
will result in a “domino effect” (Mukadi, 2012:1233). The decisive moment in this 
respect was the release of a G5 Joint Statement (US, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the UK) in 2012, announcing that FATCA compliance will be provided by a 
framework for inter-governmental AEOI on pertinent financial accounts (Grinberg, 
2013:332; Essers, 2014:60). 
Accordingly, the legal basis for the implementation of FATCA was found in special 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) that resolve the problem of incompatibility 
of national laws with FATCA. Put simply, the solution was found in the “routing 
mechanism”, which entails that FFIs do not report relevant information directly to 
the IRS, but rather to their local tax authorities, who will further engage in the 
exchange of information with their US counterparts (Oberson, 2015:157). Two 
types (so-called Model 1 and Model 2) of IGAs have been prepared by the US 
Treasury and have been accordingly used in negotiations with other countries 
(Gupta, 2013:223-224). Each of the models has a sub-version, targeted at countries 
which have concluded neither a double tax treaty nor a special Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the US. Model 1 IGA is the only one incorporat-
ing the concept of reciprocal information exchange. Therefore, it has been selected 
as a template for the creation of the OECD’s Global Standard (see below, section 3).2 
3  oecD’s coMMon RePoRtInG stanDaRD as a sYMbol of tHe  
neW eRa of InfoRMatIon eXcHanGe
In 2013 the G20 countries committed to the OECD’s proposal for a model of 
AEOI to be implemented on a global basis (the OECD’s Global Standard). The 
OECD made it clear at the outset that its intention was to set a minimum standard 
for AEOI, without the intention of restricting the existing models (OECD, 
2014:10). The highlight of this initiative came in 2014, when the OECD released 
the document titled “The Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
Information” (Oberson, 2015:184). 
2 Conversely, Model 2 IGA was perceived as unsuitable for global cooperation due to its limited scope and 
provisions according to which financial institutions provide information on US customers to US tax authorities. 
Hence, the usage of the Model 2 IGA has been limited to countries with strong privacy and banking secrecy 
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2153.1  coMPonents of tHe oecD’s Global stanDaRD anD Its 
IMPleMentatIon
The OECD’s Global Standard actually consists of two main components: 1) the 
Model Competent Authority Agreement (Model CAA), which is essentially a tem-
plate for a legal instrument enabling AEOI between participating countries; and 2) 
the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which lays down reporting and due dili-
gence requirements in respect of specific categories of financial accounts, in a 
fashion similar to FATCA (see above, section 2.2.1). Accordingly, it should be 
noted that the Model CAA is primarily addressed to participating tax authorities 
who want to regulate their mutual AEOI relationships, whereas the CRS is primar-
ily aimed at banks and other financial institutions upon which the reporting and 
due diligence obligations are imposed (McGill, 2016:2).
Akin to the role played by IGAs for FATCA enforcement (see above, section 2.2.2), 
the CAA links the legal basis for inter-country exchange of information (i.e. Multi-
lateral Convention) with the CRS (Oberson, 2015:197). While the CAA is drafted as 
a reciprocal agreement, it may also provide for a non-reciprocal exchange, consider-
ing that some countries may not be interested in receiving information (Radcliffe, 
2014:162). In a classic reciprocal scenario, each party must annually exchange the 
obtained information with other competent authority on an automatic basis. The 
information is to be exchanged within nine months from the end of the calendar year 
to which it relates (Oberson, 2015:199). As per section 4 of the Model CAA, if the 
“requesting state” receives incomplete or incorrect information, it has to notify the 
“requested state” to take appropriate measures to address the errors or non-compli-
ance. Unlike FATCA, the Model CAA does not envisage withholding obligations, 
placing some doubts over enforcement of the Global Standard (Oberson, 2015:200-
201). However, it should be noted that the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (below, the Global Forum) has been 
entrusted with the task of monitoring and reviewing the Global Standard in the form 
of peer-reviews (Radcliffe, 2014:162). 
In order to give effect to the Global Standard, each participating country has to 
fulfil certain legal requirements. First, for the conclusion of CAA there has to be a 
legal basis for inter-governmental information exchange, such as Art. 26 of a 
bilateral tax treaty that replicates the OECD Model (see above, section 2.1). The 
most suitable legal basis for the operation of CAA is probably provided by the 
Multilateral Convention (see above, section 2.1), that has a global reach, allows 
for all forms of administrative cooperation and contains rules on confidentiality 
and the proper use of information (OECD, 2014b:13). In order for information to 
be exchanged automatically under the Multilateral Convention, a separate agree-
ment between the competent authorities is required. Accordingly, the CAA fulfils 
the function of activating and operationalizing AEOI between the parties (OECD, 
2014b:13; Dourado, 2015:1854; Oberson, 2015:188). Second, the CRS is legally 
binding upon “reporting financial institutions” only if it is implemented into 
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216 Hitherto around 100 countries around the world have publicly committed to the 
implementation of the Global Standard. Notably, the US is not among participat-
ing jurisdictions and this does not seem likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
As the US representatives officially explained to the OECD, their country will 
insist on administering AEOI as envisaged in FATCA and in IGAs signed with 
other countries (Parillo, 2015:727). It is not entirely clear whether this entails the 
US being treated as a “non-participating jurisdiction” for CRS purposes, since the 
OECD has repeatedly acknowledged that the adoption of its Global Standard has 
been made possible by FATCA. In any case, interaction between FATCA and the 
CRS breeds some uncertainty and adds complexity in determining financial insti-
tutions’ legal responsibilities (see below, section 4.1.). 
 
3.2 coMMon RePoRtInG stanDaRD: a closeR looK
The CRS, a key element of the OECD’s Global Standard, sets out reporting and 
due diligence requirements with regard to specific types of accounts (“reportable 
accounts”). These obligations fall on the shoulders of “reporting financial institu-
tions”, which encompass a wide range of financial institutions and investment 
entities (e.g. brokers, collective investment vehicles, certain insurance compa-
nies) (Oberson, 2015:189). Reporting financial institutions are obliged to collect 
information and report the collected information to their local competent 
authorities who will then exchange the information with other jurisdictions 
(Knobel and Meinzer, 2014:16). With the aim of preventing taxpayers from cir-
cumventing the model by shifting assets to institutions or investment products 
not covered by the model, the scope is set widely not only in relation to the defi-
nition of reporting financial institutions, but also in two further dimensions 
(OECD, 2014b:12). First, relevant information to be reported is defined very 
broadly, covering different types of investment income (e.g. interest, dividends) 
as well as addressing situations in which a taxpayer attempts to hide capital. 
Second, “reportable accounts” encompass not only accounts held by individual 
taxpayers, but also accounts held by interposed legal entities or arrangements 
(e.g. shell companies, trusts, etc.). In essence, this means that financial institutions 
are required to “look through” the often complex ownership structures to find 
beneficial owners (Oberson, 2015:189). 
These core CRS requirements have to be translated into the domestic law of par-
ticipating jurisdictions. In doing so, each state not only has substantial leeway in 
choosing implementation techniques (e.g. primary legislation, administrative 
guidance, etc.), but also in deciding on the level of detail that will be contained in 
its domestic rules on reporting, due diligence and other CRS requirements (OECD, 
2015a:10-11). Moreover, participating jurisdictions are free to cherry-pick among 
a number of optional CRS provisions/definitions, depending on the specifics of 
their domestic legal framework (OECD, 2015a:11-17). Even more importantly, 
individual countries may embark upon an even more ambitious approach, impos-
ing additional due diligence requirements on financial institutions, with the aim of 
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217evident that the legal nature of the CRS breeds local idiosyncrasies, which raises 
serious concerns for reporting financial institutions (see below, section 4.1). 
Finally, it should be noted that the CRS (see section IX) requires each participat-
ing jurisdiction to ensure, within its domestic legal framework, effective compli-
ance with its basic requirements. For this purpose, a number of rules and adminis-
trative procedures must be translated into domestic law, e.g. an anti-avoidance 
rule or penalty regime for non-compliant financial institutions (OECD, 2014b:207-
211). Different local approaches will arise also in this regard, since every country 
will first compare its existing legal framework with CRS requirements and then 
adapt it as may be necessary (OECD, 2015a:23; Radcliffe, 2014:166).
4  assessMent of tHe cRs: Do PotentIal benefIts oUtWeIGH tHe 
costs?
This section addresses the most vexing problems associated with the introduction 
of CRS and its implementation around the globe, which may compromise the 
attainment of legitimate policy goals that underlie the OECD’s approach in the 
area of tax transparency and administrative co-operation. 
4.1 coMPleXItY anD IncoHeRence of tHe ReGUlatoRY fRaMeWoRK 
As may be inferred from the analysis presented in previous sections, the OECD’s 
Global Standard is extremely ambitious when juxtaposed to the institutional 
arrangements for AEOI that dominated in the preceding period and are also widely 
used today (see section 2.1). First, it largely embraces core elements of FATCA, 
which are indeed revolutionary (see section 2.2). Second, it is fully based on the 
premise of multilateralism, establishing a system of universal principles and rules 
to be implemented across national borders (see section 3.1). 
Accordingly, considerable caution is advised for all stakeholders when assessing 
the benefits of this new regime. More precisely, one should not underestimate 
potential costs to be incurred by stakeholders due to the rising complexity of the 
regulatory framework(s). This is indeed a familiar concern from a policy stand-
point: it is well-established in the tax literature that policymakers’ pursuit for solu-
tions which are deemed “first-best” in the light of normative precepts like equity 
and/or efficiency usually come at the expense of simplicity of the tax system 
(Kaplow, 1999; Krever, 2003; Rosen, 2008:368-369), which conversely is a value 
in itself (Stiglitz, 2000:497; Hyman, 2011:425). For the purpose of the ensuing 
analysis we adhere to the view that compliance costs serve as key evidence of the 
level of tax complexity (Krever and Mellor, 2015:1). 
In light of the mechanics of information exchange envisaged in the Global 
Standard (see above, section 3) it is perfectly clear that the additional cost linked 
with the complexity of the new regime is not an issue for the taxpayers, since their 
role in the international information exchange is merely “passive”. Conversely, 
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218 other financial intermediaries (Grinberg, 2013:366-367; McGill, 2016:sec. 1). In 
this respect particular attention should be drawn to the costs arising due to 
existence of multiple instruments regulating AEOI, as well as inconsistencies 
between them (Oberson, 2015:247). 
4.1.1 financial institutions’ perspective: increased compliance costs
Taking a bird-eye view on the matter, it is visible that a multinational financial 
institution (MFI) will in all likelihood have to comply with at least three AEOI 
models: 1) the FATCA model, which regulates their relationship with US tax 
authorities; 2) a system based on EU DAC; 3) a multilateral framework modelled 
in accordance with OECD’s Global Standard. The biggest issue at hand is how 
these overlapping models fit together, not only when it comes to resolving poten-
tial conflicts in application (Altenburger, 2015), but even more importantly as 
regards to disparities between the specified rules and standards for collection, 
storage and transmission of data (Vainstendael, 2014:1152; McGill, 2016: sec. 
5.1). The former aspect has been particularly underscored by the financial institu-
tions themselves, within the public debate on global implementation of FATCA 
(Grinberg, 2013:348-349) and in subsequent discussions on the implications of 
the introduction of the CRS. 
On the face of it, the OECD’s CRS replicates the system set up by international 
agreements adopted for FATCA purposes (Model 1 IGAs): under both systems 
financial intermediaries are obliged to perform due diligence during collection of 
data about specific account holders, implement processes for efficient data storage 
and finally report relevant information to respective tax authorities. However, 
there are some marked differences as regards specifics of these obligations, 
making it clear that the CRS is much more than a global “extension” of FATCA 
(KPMG, 2014:2).3 Some of the most important discrepancies directly cause 
increased compliance costs for financial institutions. 
First, the scope of due diligence and reporting procedures under the CRS is sig-
nificantly broader than that under FATCA. Not only does the CRS require that 
these procedures are implemented in relation to tax residents of more than 100 
participating countries, but it does not employ FATCA-like exemptions for low-
value accounts (KPMG, 2014:25). Second, on a more technical level, forms that 
are used under the FATCA-based framework are of no use for CRS purposes 
(McGill, 2016:sec. 5.1). Instead, the CRS relies upon a specific self-certification 
mechanism in order to identify reportable accounts. Third, there is some inconsist-
ency between the CRS and FATCA as regards the classification of financial and 
non-financial entities (OECD, 2015a:20). Notably, the CRS classifies investment 
entities (e.g. trusts, investment funds) resident in a non-participating country as 
“passive non-financial entities”, meaning that reporting financial institutions are 
required to document and report on their beneficial owners (see above, section 
3.2). Conversely, under FATCA and Model 1 IGA such investment entities man-
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219aged by a MFI are classified as financial institutions and there are no look-through 
requirements (Parillo, 2015:728). Against the background of the ambiguous status 
of the US as a (non-)participating country for CRS purposes (see above, section 
3.1), it is apparent that a number of MFIs will face a conundrum in entity classifi-
cation and determination of ensuing responsibilities (KPMG, 2014:28). Fourth, 
unlike under FATCA, the CRS does not require financial intermediaries to with-
hold tax on certain US payments made to non-compliant persons and entities. 
While the fact that this important “punitive” feature of FATCA is missing under 
the CRS may come as a relief for MFIs, they still need to be extremely wary of the 
prospect that countries take diverse approaches to enforcement of CRS require-
ments (see above, section 3.2). 
An inevitable outcome of this lack of AEOI standardization on a global scale is the 
increase in compliance costs for banks and other financial intermediaries. The 
burden will be higher, both in absolute and in relative terms, for the biggest MFIs 
operating in the majority of countries around the world, as they would have to 
meet terms with a number of local regulatory variances, thus multiplying the total 
compliance cost (Grinberg, 2013:350; KPMG, 2014:2). Arguably, such concerns 
may be mitigated to a certain extent by technological advancements (McGill, 
2016:sec. 7), since IT systems supporting due diligence and reporting processes 
can be amended to capture all features envisaged under both CRS and domestic 
legislation. In this respect it should be noted that the importance of common or 
compatible technical solutions for reporting and exchanging information in line 
with the CRS has been recognized by the OECD (2014b:14). While such an 
approach may reduce overall compliance costs in the future, it entails significant 
investments in technology-based solutions for financial institutions in the short 
run (KPMG, 2014:3). 
4.1.2 tax authorities’ perspective: administering the new arrangements for aeoI
On the other side of the same coin, the complexity of the new global AEOI archi-
tecture – with the CRS at the heart of it – may pose quite a burden on tax authori-
ties, which are required to collect a massive load of relevant information from 
local financial intermediaries, as well as to exchange this information, largely in a 
reciprocal manner, with their foreign counterparts. As is the case with any com-
prehensive usage of information transmitted from third party intermediaries to the 
tax authorities, the success of these new arrangements will largely depend on the 
quality of systems in place for electronic reporting and matching of data with tax 
authorities’ own records (OECD, 2015b:307). Doubts have been expressed in the 
literature as to the capacity of tax authorities, particularly those of developing 
countries, fully to capitalize on the AEOI developments due to institutional and/or 
technical constraints, putting an additional strain on their already limited resources 
(Grinberg, 2013:347-348; Mosquera Valderrama, 2015:sec. 5.3.1.3.; McGill, 
2016:sec. 7). As noted in the OECD’s report on the role of capacity building in a 
tax administration, various instruments for provision of technical assistance and 
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220 tively implement the new Global Standard for AEOI (OECD, 2016:23-24). In this 
respect, promising steps have already been taken under the auspices of the OECD’s 
Global Forum and other international organizations (Grinberg, 2013:359; OECD, 
2016:23-32). 
To sum up, the potential of the CRS to act as a powerful anti-tax evasion tool, thus 
having positive revenue effects for participating governments, may be seriously 
hindered by existing administrative constraints and by the outlay of resources 
respective revenue bodies have to make in order to assure effective implementa-
tion of a global AEOI framework. Accordingly, assertions that developed coun-
tries would benefit the most from the CRS seem quite convincing (Mosquera 
Valderrama, 2015:sec. 5.3.1.3.).
4.2 PRotectIon of taXPaYeRs’ RIGHts
Taxpayers, apart from being obliged to pay taxes, are information holders and as 
such they have to report, determine, compute and pay taxes. Their duties increase 
domestically and internationally with the global development of information 
exchange and in those procedures their interests are protected by various rights 
contained in domestic or international instruments. Taxpayer rights include the 
right to a fair process in the exchange of information proceedings, basic privacy 
protection and procedural rights. Oberson (2015:209) notes that “the more global 
the exchange of information, the greater risk of breaches of confidentiality, privacy 
and secrecy provisions or even abuse in the use of data obtained.”
Oberson (2015:211) analyses the scope of taxpayers’ rights and summarizes a 
minimum standard consisting of the right to be informed and heard, the right of 
appeal, the right to pay an exact amount of tax, the right to certainty, the right to 
privacy and the right to confidentiality and secrecy. Another limitation is that 
information does not have to be supplied to another jurisdiction if its disclosure is 
contrary to the ordre public (public policy) of the supplying state, which is the 
term relating to, e.g. proceedings which would result in imposition and execution 
of death penalty, torture or other violations of human rights as well as tax investi-
gations motivated by political, racial or religious prosecution (OECD, 2014a).
The role of exchange of information is to prevent double taxation, which is in the 
interest of taxpayers, as well as to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance, which is 
in the interest of the states. The protection of taxpayers’ interests is crucial because 
the exchange of information relates to personal data and potentially confidential 
information. Therefore, the governments have to take into account the interests of 
taxpayers when fulfilling obligation to exchange information (Oberson, 2015:212). 
Taxpayers as well as tax administrations have a legal right that the exchanged 
information remain confidential. Financial information is sensitive and it should 
be handled appropriately. International exchange will be trustworthy only if the 
information is used and disclosed in accordance with the legal instruments allow-
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221Oberson (2015:213) points out that in exchanging information with contracting 
states, certain rules should be followed. A requesting state should make an effort 
to collect information under the domestic law before turning to a foreign state 
(principle of subsidiarity). Furthermore, the competent authorities of the contract-
ing states are obliged to exchange information which is foreseeably relevant for 
implementation of international law instruments, in which “foreseeably relevant” 
provides for the widest possible extent of exchange of information, but rules out 
“fishing expeditions”. Finally, competent authorities must keep information 
received through exchange of information as confidential, taking into account 
domestic laws on secrecy in tax matters as well as protection provided by inter-
national law. 
Baker and Pistone (2015:59) warn that the growth of AEOI in recent years will 
cause large amounts of financial data about taxpayers to flow between tax 
authorities. The importance of security of the data will therefore be more signifi-
cant than in the case of exchange of information upon request. In applying this 
method of exchange of information, it might be impractical to inform each tax-
payer of the exchange so it will be sufficient that the taxpayers are informed by 
financial institutions that the information provided to them may be subject to the 
automatic exchange (Baker and Pistone, 2015:64).
As examined above (section 3), implementation of the CRS is based on a specific 
instrument of international law which allows AEOI, such as a Multilateral 
Convention or a bilateral tax treaty. Therefore, confidentiality and data protection 
within the CRS framework is based on this instrument (Oberson, 2015:219). Both 
bilateral tax treaties and the Multilateral Convention contain provisions on the 
confidentiality of information exchanged and limit the persons who have access to 
the information as well as purposes for which the information may be used 
(OECD, 2014b:13).
Under Section 5(1) of the Model CAA all information exchanged is subject to the 
confidentiality rules and other safeguards provided for in the above mentioned 
international instrument, including the provisions limiting the use of the informa-
tion exchanged and, to the extent needed to ensure the necessary level of protec-
tion of personal data, in accordance with the safeguards which may be specified 
by the supplying Competent Authority as required under its domestic law. There-
fore, the importance of the confidentiality and data safeguards has been recog-
nized within the new global model of AEOI. It has to be noted that jurisdictions 
provide for different rules on protection of personal data of taxpayers – the data 
subject’s right to information, access correction and the oversight mechanism. The 
state supplying information may specify in the agreement the safeguards which 
have to be respected in accordance with its national law. The receiving state’s 
obligation is to provide practical implementation and respecting of the safeguards, 
which have to be in compliance with its own national law as well as domestic law 
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222 Moreno González (2016:147) notes that the efforts in international and suprana-
tional taxation aimed at improving the exchange of information among tax admin-
istrations have not been accompanied by corresponding improvement of the pro-
tection of taxpayers’ rights and the personal data obtained through that process.
5 conclUsIon
A serious crisis, it has been said, should never go to waste, which may be applied 
to the issues explored in this paper. Indeed, a major shift in the framework for 
international exchange of information occurred in the aftermath of the latest global 
economic crisis. It has to be acknowledged that until fairly recently the veil of 
bank secrecy protected taxpayers from having their assets and income revealed to 
the revenue bodies of the states of their residence. Insufficient mechanisms for the 
exchange of information with other countries, or the utter absence of them, was 
thus recognised as a crucial element in characterizing a tax system as “harmful” or 
even giving a country the label of tax haven. Ground-breaking work in the post-
crisis period has been undertaken mainly by the OECD, with the strong support by 
G20 countries and EU member states, bringing about a new paradigm in this area. 
A considerable degree of caution is, however, advised in the analysis of the effects 
of this global initiative for tax transparency, since some recent estimates find that 
around USD 7.6 trillion or 8% of global households’ total financial wealth is still 
hidden in tax havens (Zucman, 2015:35). 
The crucial impetus towards a global system of automatic exchange of informa-
tion (AEOI) was the adoption of FATCA in the US. Its basic features were adopted 
and, mutatis mutandis, incorporated in the OECD’s Global Standard for AEOI, 
released in 2014. This paper has devoted particular attention to the Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS), as a key component of the Global Standard. The CRS 
comprises a two-tier system of annual reporting of data about account holders and 
due diligence procedures necessary to identify reportable accounts. 
The matter of CRS implementation still remains open as the first exchanges are 
planned for 2017. Against this backdrop, we highlighted some concerns regarding 
the functioning of the new system. Pertinent compliance costs will definitely be 
substantial and this burden will be borne both by tax administrations and financial 
institutions. Attention was drawn to the problem of incoherence between the CRS 
and other AEOI systems currently in force, such as FATCA. Accordingly, it was 
argued that the CRS is much more than a global “extension” of FATCA. From the 
perspective of reporting financial institutions, the biggest concern is that it is 
unlikely that any two countries will implement the CRS in the same manner in 
their domestic law, bringing about additional costs in order to comply with all the 
local variances. Likewise, tax authorities will have to invest additional resources 
in order to effectively implement the new system and reap its potential benefits. In 
this regard developed countries – having sophisticated tax administrations – are in 
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223Another vexing concern relates to the protection of taxpayers’ rights within the 
AEOI procedures. We emphasized that the information exchange under OECD’s 
Global Standard must abide by the safeguards relating to the data to be exchanged, 
the procedures used as well as the access to the data exchanged and the use to 
which it can be put. Often sensitive data should be handled confidentially while 
respecting data protection standards set out by the international tax law instru-
ments as well as domestic laws of both countries involved in the exchange. How-
ever, it seems that we are still very much in uncharted waters with regard to the 
status of taxpayers’ rights within global AEOI architecture and the issue has been 
given serious attention only fairly recently, in both academic and policy circles.4 
In conclusion, the “brave new world” of tax transparency symbolized by the CRS 
is, and will remain in the foreseeable future, yet another battlefield between con-
flicting tax policy norms (e.g. tax equity, simplicity, protection of human rights, 
etc.). In our view, its ultimate success or failure will be dictated by the aptness of 
multilateral responses to the most pressing problems at hand.
Disclosure statement 
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.


















































































41 (2) 207-226 (2017)
224 RefeRences
1. Altenburger, P. R., 2015. Coexistence between FATCA and MCAA – potential 
conflicts. Tax Notes International, 77(4), pp. 337-340. 
2. André Rocha, S., 2016. Exchange of Tax-Related Information and the Protec-
tion of Taxpayer Rights: General Comments and the Brazilian Perspective. 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 70(9), pp. 502-516.
3. Baker, P. and Pistone, P., 2015. General Report in Cahiers de droit fiscal inter-
national, vol. 100B. The practical protection of taxpayers’ rights. IFA.
4. Blank, J. D. and Mason, R., 2014. Exporting FATCA. NYU Law and Econom-
ics Research Paper, No. 14-05. Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2389500>.
5. Dizdarevic, M. A., 2011. The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going 
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before. Fordham Law Review, 79(6), pp. 
2967-2994.
6. Dourado, A., 2015. “Article 26: Exchange of information” in: K. Vogel [et al.]. 
Klaus Vogel on double taxation conventions. Den Haag: Wolters Kluwer, Law 
& Business.
7. Essers, P., 2014. International tax justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 68(2), pp. 54-66.
8. G20, 2009. The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform. Final Communique of 
the G20 Summit Held in London on 2 April 2009. Available at: <http://www.
cfr.org/financial-crises/g20-global-plan-recovery-reform-april-2009/p19017>. 
9. Gordon, R. K., 1996. “Law of Tax Administration and Procedure” in: V. Thu-
rony (ed.). Tax law design and drafting Vol. 1 Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund.
10. Grinberg, I., 2012. Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the Interna-
tional Tax System. Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1996752>.
11. Grinberg, I., 2013. Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA 
Open the Door?, World Tax Journal, 5(3), pp. 319.-322. 
12. Gupta, A., 2013. “The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act” in: O. C. 
Günther and N. Tüchler, eds. Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. 
Wien: Linde, pp. 221-239.
13. Holm, A., 2014. “Extraterritorial Taxation in the Design of United States Tax 
Policy: Citizenship-Based Taxation and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act” in: R. Petruzzi and K. Spies, eds. Tax Policy Challenges in the 21st 
Century. Wien: Linde, pp. 447-470.
14. Hyman, D. N., 2010. Public finance: a contemporary application of theory to 
policy. Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning.
15. Kaplow, L. 1999. “How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity 
and Efficiency of the Income Tax” in: J. Slemrod (ed.), Tax policy in the real 
world Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/
CBO9780511625909.025
16. Knobel, A. and Meinzer, M., 2014. Final Report. “The end of bank secrecy”? 


















































































41 (2) 207-226 (2017)
225of OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) and its alternatives. Available 
at: <http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TJN-141124-CRS- 
AIE-End-of-Banking-Secrecy.pdf>. 
17. KPMG, 2014. Automatic Exchange of Information: The Common Reporting 
Standard. Available at: <https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndIn-
sights/ArticlesPublications/frontiers-in-tax/Documents/the-common-report-
ing-standard.pdf>.
18. Krever, R. and Mellor, P., 2015. Where’s the Complexity in Tax Law? Available 
at: <http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Events/confe-
re nces/symposia/2015/krever-paper.pdf>.
19. Krever, R., 2003. Taming Complexity in Australian Income Tax (December 1, 
2003). Sydney Law Review, 25(4), pp. 467-505. Available at: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1666064>.
20. McGill, R., 2016. International – GATCA: The Globalization of Anti-Tax Eva-
sion Frameworks. Derivatives & Financial Instruments, 18(3). 
21. Moreno González, S., 2016. The Automatic Exchange of Tax Information and 
the Protection of Personal Data in the European Union: Reflections on the 
Latest Jurisprudential and Normative Advances. EC Tax Review, 25(3), pp. 
146-161.
22. Mosquera Valderrama, I. J., 2015. Legitimacy and the Making of International 
Tax Law: The Challenges of Multilateralism. World Tax Journal, 7(3). 
23. Mukadi, J. N., 2012. FATCA and the the shaping of a new international tax 
order. Tax Notes International, 66(13), pp. 1227-1233.
24. Oberson, X., 2015. International Exchange of Information in Tax Matters: 
Towards Global Transparency. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. doi: 10.4337/9781784714727
25. OECD, 1998. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. Paris: 
OECD.
26. OECD, 2012. Automatic Exchange of Information: what it is, how it works, 
benefits, what remains to be done. Paris: OECD.
27. OECD, 2013. Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Paris: OECD.
28. OECD, 2014a. Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Infor-
mation in Tax Matters. Paris: OECD.
29. OECD, 2014b. Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Infor-
mation: Common reporting standard. Paris: OECD.
30. OECD, 2015a. Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in 




31. OECD, 2015b. Tax Administration 2015: Comparative Information on OECD 
and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies. Paris: OECD. doi: 10.1787/
tax_admin-2015-en
32. OECD, 2016. Tax Administrations and Capacity Building: A Collective Chal-


















































































41 (2) 207-226 (2017)
226 33. Owens, J. P., 2014. Tax transparency: the ‘Full Monty’. Bulletin for Inter-
national Taxation, 68(9), pp. 512-514.
34. Parillo, K. A., 2015. U.S. Position on OECD Standard Problematic for Trusts 
and Funds. Tax Notes, 148(7), pp. 727-728.
35. Picciotto, S., 1992. International business taxation: a study in the internation-
alization of business regulation. New York: Quorum Books.
36. Pomeranz, D., 2015. No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-
Enforcement in the Value Added Tax. American Economic Review, 105(8), pp. 
2539-2569. doi: 10.1257/aer.20130393
37. Radcliffe, P., 2014. The OECD’s Common Reporting Standard: The Next Step 
in the Global Fight against Tax Evasion. Derivatives & Financial Instruments, 
16(4), pp. 160-169.
38. Ring, D., 2016, Article 26: Exchange of Information – Global Tax Treaty Com-
mentaries. 
39. Rosen, H. and Gayer, T., 2008. Public Finance. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_22
40. Somare, M. and Wöhrer, V., 2015. Automatic exchange of financial infor-
mation under the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the light of the 
global movement towards transparency. Intertax, 43(12), pp. 804-815.
41. Somare, M. and Wöhrer, V., 2015. Automatic Exchange of Financial Infor-
mation under the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Light of the 
Global Movement towards Transparency. Intertax, 43(12), pp. 804-815.
42. Stevens, S. A., 2014. The Duty of Countries and Enterprises to Pay Their Fair 
Share. Intertax, 42(11), pp. 702-708.
43. Stiglitz, J. E., 2000. Economics of the public sector. New York: W.W. Norton.
44. Tello, C. P., 2014. FATCA: catalyst for global cooperation on exchange of tax 
information. Bulletin for International Taxation, 68(2), pp. 88-102.
45. Turina, A., Visible, Though Not Visible in Itself. Transparency at the Cross-
roads of International Financial Regulation and International Taxation. World 
Tax Journal 8(3).
46. Vanistendael, F., 1996. “Legal Framework for Taxation” in: V. Thurony, ed. 
Tax law design and drafting Vol. 1 Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund, pp. 15-70.
47. Vanistendael, F., 2014. The international information exchange puzzle. Tax 
Notes International, 75(13), pp. 1149-1153.
48. Zucman, G., 2015. The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens. 
Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press. doi: 10.7208/chica-
go/9780226245560.001.0001
